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THE LANGUAGES OF INDONESIAN POLITICS
The language of contemporary Indonesian politics has recently 
been the object of a certain amount of attention, usually rather 
cantankerous, from Gallic and American critics. While the French 
observers have tended to see mainly "reiterations obsessionelles" 
and "les cris sourds d'une civilisation Inourante*1, our more program- 
oriented analysts have concerned themselves with what they feel 
to be vague sloganeering and hypocritical propagandizing. In 
both cases, however, the forms of modern Indonesian, in so far 
as they are understood, are seen as forms of evasion and defeat 
before the challenges of the Old West, and in the gloomy comments 
of both can be detected an unmistakeable Schadenfreude. No one 
has yet attempted to look at the language of contemporary Indonesia 
as an enterprise for the mastery of a gigantic cultural crisis, 
and a partly subconscious project for the assumption of "modernity" 
within the modalities of an autonomous and autochthonous social- 
political tradition. Yet this is of decisive importance for the 
generations that lie ahead, since with every decade that passes, 
"Indonesian" is becoming more and more the one language through 
which Indonesians of all kinds are coming to grips with modern 
and ancient realities. The polyglots of the colonial and early 
post-revolutionary period are slowly beginning to disappear from 
the scene. The "new Indonesian" is therefore of paramount import­
ance for the shaping of the younger Indonesian national conscious­
ness .
The extraordinary character of modern "political" Indonesian 
(with which we are especially concerned) is that it is in­
evitably the heir of three separate languages and two separate 
linguistic-cultural traditions. The languages are Dutch, Javanese, 
and "Revolutionary Malay" - the traditions are Dutch-Western and 
Javanese. The "enterprise" of modern Indonesian in the 60s and 
70s is therefore the synthesis of a new political-cultural 
intelligence and perspective, which was completely fragmented 
in the colonial and early post-colonial period, and the restora­
tion of a unity of consciousness such as has not existed for the 
Indonesian literati since the initial confrontation with Dutch 
colonialism. The new Indonesian has had to develop into a means 
of communication which can not only express Indonesian nationalism, 
but Indonesian aspirations, Indonesian traditions and "international 
realities" - within the limits of a single vocabulary. The 
colossal cultural effort involved, and the remarkable success 
achieved, seems to me to have been inadequately appreciated, and 
the morphology of the transformations involved insufficiently 
studied.
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Colonial Indonesia was a bureaucratic Wonderland: a cluster
of interacting but basically separate linguistic and cultural 
universes, linked by the miracle of modern bureaucratic and 
technical organization. Each language, be it Batak, Sundanese, 
Javanese or Dutch, was the product of separate historical experi­
ences, community organizations, literary and cultural specializa­
tion and metaphysical outlook. The discontinuities between these 
linguistic-cultural universes were fundamental to the structure 
of colonialism. The response to these discontinuities on the 
part of "Indonesian" literati was inevitably therefore primarily 
and primordially expressed in bi-lingualism, since only through 
the mastery of the language of the Other could the chasm betweeen 
the universes be bridged and the colonial system challenged on 
something like even ground.
But the leap out of (say) Batak into Dutch meant far more 
than the acquisition of a new technical vocabulary and the ability 
to peer into the arcana of Dutch domination. It also involved the 
development of two inter-acting or conflicting modes of con­
sciousness. The new generation of bi-lingual literati (which 
arose about the end of the 19th Century) thus became cultural 
"middlemen," but inevitably middlemen who were as much involved 
in the effort to control two mental universes as facilitating 
communication between them. In the colonial situation, bi­
lingualism was not merely a technical, but also a grave psycho­
logical and ultimately religious, problem.
For the acquisition of the colonial language implied a change 
in the modalities of consciousness. It was far more than just 
the discovery of a radically different set of phonetic equivalents 
for the inventory of one’s own language. The structure of Dutch 
(and through it of European) thought and consciousness was it­
self fundamentally different from those of the traditional 
Indonesian languages, and the advance to bi-lingualism therefore 
in itself created profound mental and spiritual displacement - 
what our modern economic-cultural missionaries like to call 
"cultural shock," but at a much deeper and more human level. The 
profounder the knowledge of the acquired language, and the more 
this language substituted itself for the aboriginal language as 
the medium of thought and discourse, the more destructive and/or 
creative (according to individual talents and situations) became 
the two-mindedness of the literati.
It is one of the ironies of colonial history that, since the 
psychological effort to maintain equilibrium between two universes 
is so immense that few can sustain it, the "radicals" who leapt 
out into Dutch and "conquered" the organization and methodology of 
colonial society, found themselves increasingly isolated from the 
aboriginal Indonesian world, and having acted as pioneers they 
found themselves later for a large part culturally marooned on 
the farther Western shore. A newer generation grew up for whom 
the "conquest" was a thing of the past, and whose basic task was
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the development of a counter-language to Dutch, a modern, nation­
alist language, which would re-establish the connection with 
Indonesian traditions in itself, without compelling each individual 
to master the crisis internally through a bi-lingual conquest.
While one generation struggled to work its way out of the 
traditional modes of thinking, the next has been trying to re­
establish contact with and build on them. In this attempt, an 
immense act of social and national creativity is involved.
The theoretical implications of this quest for a fundamental 
national unity (not basically a question of inter-regional homo­
genization but one of spiritual unity between mental universes) 
have too often been ignored, and reduced to superficial main­
tenance of "folk-culture" in a quite synthetic way. There has 
been too much focus on bureaucratic "marination" of the external 
emblems of aboriginal tradition (costumes, adat, etc.), and too 
little on the deeper communal quest for a sense of rooted 
identity, expressed at all levels of the population, through the 
adventures and transformations of the national language.
The main thrust of what follows below therefore is the search 
for the over-all lines of this act of creativity. The main focus 
will be on the Javanese, for a number of reasons, the most im­
portant of which is that the combination of political power, 
numbers and strength of cultural identity of the Javanese has 
made them the single most creative force in developing the new 
Indonesian. How has "Revolutionary Malay" set about the task 
of disciplining and uniting the bureaucratic colonial vocabulary, 
the Western democratic-socialist vocabulary, the nationalist­
revolutionary vocabulary, and that of Javanese tradition? How 
has this "synthesis" been stretched or transformed to adjust to 
the "realities" of urban Indonesia today? I believe that the 
most satisfactory perspective for understanding this development 
is a growing imposition of Javanese "flesh" on the "skeleton" 
of "Revolutionary Malay” - though this is in fact only a part 
of an immensely complicated and perhaps ultimately incomprehen­
sible process.
It may be helpful to start with some consideration of an 
earlier confrontation between the Javanese and an alien civiliza­
tion - that of Middle Eastern Islam - since the pattern of 
modalities is quite clearly visible in that now-distant clash.
While secular power in Old Java was largely held by bureau­
cratic functionaries of the rulers, particularly the Bupati, 
religious and intellectual power was wielded, particularly in 
those areas where royal authority was weakest, by the kjai. One 
found them in the Pasisir, and in traditional "rebel" areas 
(remote valley-fortresses like Bagelen and Ponorogo). The kjai 
was essentially a man of greater knowledge and wisdom than his
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fellows, and accordingly the main institution of kjai was the 
pesantr&n or rural Islamic school. The pesantren education was 
quite explicitly an inwijding, an initiation into the higher 
wisdom. The social structure of the pesantren, in which the 
holy kjai himself was assisted by more or less advanced pupils, 
reflected the conception of education as a path to wisdom (rather 
than knowledge). Now the prestige of the kjai rested on many 
factors, on his reputed ancestry, his magical healing powers, 
his experience, and his personal character - but above all on 
his mastery of an esoteric vocabulary. The most important ele­
ment in this vocabulary was^ generally speaking, Arabic.
The normal method of instruction of boys and youths in the 
pesantren was the inculcation by rote of extensive passages of 
Arabic or Koranic texts - and their subsequent elucidation by 
the Master. It has often been claimed that this rote-learning 
of the Koran represents the decadence or fossilization of Islam 
in Java. Yet it seems much more comprehensible to see it as a 
most important and convincing sign of Java's defence against 
Arabic culture, and its final conquest of this alien infiltra­
tion. The "domestication" of Islam and Arabic by the Javanese 
cultural impulse was done through the transformation of the 
Koran into a hermetic text-book of riddles and paradoxes. Arabic 
was maintained as the language of "initiation" precisely because 
Arabic was not understood (vide the present disastrous attempts 
to make the Latin mass "comprehensible!")> the whole point of a 
spiritual ritual in an uncomprehended language is that it mani­
fests power, limitless power, and implies a deliberately non- 
rational mode of cognition. Islam had forbidden the continued 
used of Shivaitic and Tantric mantra; Java answered by turning 
the Koran into a book of mantra.
(The fact that until quite recently it was forbidden to 
"translate" the Koran under Islamic law itself simply served 
to justify a "principle" which derived from the local culture.)
The pupils in the pesantren then acquired their Koranic 
texts by rote, and the excelling pupil was the boy who could 
recite without mistakes. Since the youth clearly "understood" 
nothing of what he was saying, the importance attached to recital 
errors has clear "magical" overtones, recalling for example balian 
incantations in Central Kalimantan, where mistakes forebode 
trouble and difficulties for the community if they are not 
corrected.
The second step in a pesantren education was the "decoding" 
of the Koranic texts and of Javanese-language riddles and 
paradoxes. This part of the educational system is marvellously 
depicted in the pages of the Serat Tjentini, in which much of 
the action revolves around wandering santri (the original meaning 
is "pupil") travelling from one pesantren to another, testing 
each other's skill in unravelling puzzles and religious 
conundrums.
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The essential point of the conundrum is that it defies 
everyday reality by removing logic from the phenomenological 
to the linguistic plane. Asking the question: "When is a man
not a man?" is phenomenologically nonsense. The resolution is 
linguistic: "When he is a lemon." The point thus turns on a
pun in the word "lemon." In this case the pun is totally 
"culturally deprived." But the religious function of the pun 
is to bridge two levels of cognition, and to create a kind of 
linguistic-religious causality (compare for example, some of the 
poems of St. John of the Cross). Taking a specifically Javanese 
example, one of the best-known religious puns is made on the o 
name of the wajang hero JudistiraTs magical weapon, the Kalimasada, 
which takes the form of a piece of esoteric writing, an incom­
prehensible document of^great power. It is in fact not what 
is written in the Kalimasada that is important, but that certain 
syllables are inscribed on it in a certain^order by a certain 
person at a certain time. While the Kalimasada is an authentic 
symbol of a pre-Islamic cultural tradition, it is common to find 
it referred to in Javanese Islamic circles: but now under the
guise of the Kalimah Sahadat, the Koranic credo or confession 
of faith. (There is even a legend describing how Judistira gave 
his weapon to Sunan Kalidjaga, one of the nine pioneering Islamic 
"apostles" in Java). One might then reverse our original riddle 
and ask: "When is the Kalimasada not the Kalimasada?" Answer:
"When it is the Kalimah Sahadat.Tr
The pun is of great importance to the Javanese Islamic tradi­
tion since it represents a sort of "capsulated" formula of an 
intuition. Neither historical nor linguistic analysis has any 
real purchase on this intuition, because it is built into the 
miraculous quality of the pun itself (How can it be coincidental?
Is the idea of coincidence meaningful only in certain cultures?), 
revealing another level of Being flowing in and out of the phenomena. 
(From an outsider, "reductivist" point-of-view of course the pun 
expresses the will-to-unity of the Javanese cultural tradition, 
the urge to unite or absorb conflicting cultural streams through 
language or linguistic symbolism.)
Thus the innerlijke wijsheid of the pesantren (and this is 
even truer of the more abangan ^ religious thought of South Central 
Java) consists almost entirely of ascetic practices, rituals and 
the presentation and analysis of spells, conundrums and paradoxes 
(prenesan). The common denominator is invariably: the phenomena
are not always what they seem to be; what really is, may not ap­
pear to be so. oOne finds simple paradoxes such as the old tag:
"Sing ana, ora ana; sing ora ana, ana." (What is, is not; what 
is not, is. ) Flore concretely the paradox is divined in the word 
longan, which literally means the space under a chair, table or 
bed. The riddles of being and non-being are fondly expressed in 
the conundrum that longan exists, yet does not exist. No chair 
can exist without it, yet it cannot exist without a chair.
94
The third aspect of the pesantren education which should be 
noted, since it runs through much of contemporary Indonesian ed­
ucation including the Universities, is that education has an 
unmistakeable metaphysical dimension; it is part of a long process 
of spiritual and mental training, an initiation into something 
inaccessible to the outsider. Far from being ?,pragmatic,f in the 
Deweyan sense, education is seen as the key to an otherwise locked 
door. This is also one way of interpreting the well-known "re­
lativism" of the Javanese Weltanschauung. The characteristic 
linguistic paradoxes and polar juxtapositions of traditional 
Javanese education allow for considerable tolerance of ambiguity 
in the phenomena - far more at least than an American or Dutch 
education - and this is because the paradoxes are an expression 
of a certainty and a truth - a metaphysical intuition of the 
commonality of being. Thus the psychological strain of accepting 
paradox and ambiguity is small, since they are seen less as 
conflicting opposites than as inter-related complementarities.
By contrast, m  Atlantic societies, precisely because any real 
sense of "certainty" in this ultimate sense has long since van­
ished, if it ever existed, and because we are trained to think 
in terms of conflict rather than complementarity, overt paradox 
and manifest contradictions arouse anxiety and the sense of skating 
out to sea on fast-melting ice. An evident ontological certitude 
underlies the shifting relativism of Javanese philosophy. The 
phenomena do not have to be saved, since they are never the sum 
of what Is. The real and the really real are closely connected, 
but not identical, and therefore it never does to be too closely 
committed to either.
It should now be clear that the whole mode of old Javanese 
Islam is in sharp contrast to that of the Kiddle East. Since
the rise of reformist Muhammadijah Islam in Java in the early
years of this century however, which took Middle Eastern "Reform"
Islam as its model, there has been a sharp break in the Islamic
ummat on Java. The "Reform" elements in Masjumi, for example, 
have made so bold as to say that the Koran means what it says!
With Talmudic literalism they have transformed the Koran from 
a key to a sort of religious Highway Code, and denied the comple­
mentary dualism which is fundamental to traditional Javanese 
thinking. Hence the violent N.U. hostility to Masjumi.
Whereas for the "ideal" modernist Arabic is the language 
of religion, which therefore must be directly understood, the 
affective non-liturgical language of the pesantren traditionalists 
is Javanese. Partly this is because Javanese is the mother- 
language, with all the secret inflexions and resonances which no 
foreign language can ever convey, partly because for the Javanese 
their language is so strongly felt to be the major expression of 
their collectivityfs identity. The allusive alliterativeness, 
the highly developed onomatopoeia of Javanese, and its rich, 
sensory vocabulary provide a treasury of non-causal causalities 
and interconnections and an enduring sense of a hidden continuity
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flowing in and around the phenomena, down to the most intimate 
sphere of people's lives. When the pesinden at a wajang per­
formance wishes to rest and warn the dalang to take over, she 
weaves the word ron ing mlindjo (leaves of the mlindjo tree) into 
her song. Since these leaves are also known as so and the 
Javankse word for rest is ngaso, the connection Is” at once felt, 
and to the mystification of the uninitiated, the dalang takes 
over the burden of the singing.
The Javanese sense of the inter-relatedness of the phenomena 
and yet scepticism about their ultimate reality is fundamental 
to any understanding of the Javanese political style. In Javanese 
social intercourse, great stress was traditionally laid on an 
emptiness between facial expression and mental attitude. Regard­
less of one's emotions, one's face should express "appropriate” 
feelings or complete impassivity. This sense of the face as a 
kind of built-in mask has been commented on by travellers and 
students of Javanese life. But it is generally misunderstood 
as: the real person is the "emotion," the false person is the
"mask" or face. In fact it is not nearly as simple as that. In 
the mask-dance for example, the relationship of the dancer to 
his mask is highly ambiguous: the mask may "formally" express
an emotion that the dancer feels but dare not express (the mask 
provides an alibi), or it may simply be "distracting," a disguise 
misleading the audience, or it may be magnetic (there is a com­
mon belief that women will fall madly in love with a masked man 
but not with the same man unmasked), or again it may take pos­
session of him, so that the man becomes the mask. The relation­
ship between the real and really real is thus once again obscure 
and intricate. It is difficult or impossible to say which is 
which. And when the <jalang sits behind the screen, manipulating 
the puppets as he chodses, imitating their various voices, ideas, 
passions and personalities, he becomes at once all of them and 
none of them.
The Pamongpradja
Whereas the most asli type of Javanese authority, such as 
we have just considered, was mono-lingual, or at least bi-lingual 
only in a very special sense - that he had acquired a store of 
esoteric Arabic mantra - the elaboration of a colonial bureaucracy 
(the Binnenlands Bestuur) with largely secular powers, required 
the cultivation of bi- or even,later, tri-lingualism. Long before 
the rise of the modern nationalist intelligentsia, the Javanese 
literati, in their function as lower-level administrators of the 
colonial government, had started to face the challenge of Dutch 
rule by the slow acquisition of Dutch and Dutch-Western modes 
of thinking. The typical figures in this respect were the 
Bupati, particularly the Bupati in areas rather remote from 
Surakarta and Jogjakarta (D^epara, Rembang, Tuban, Banjumas,
Banten are all good examples). Since the Bupati was par excel­
lence the main nexus between the rural Javanese populace and the
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colonial government, and thus positionally the vital middleman 
between two mutually uncomprehending worlds, he was forced to 
cultivate the two-mindedness that we have mentioned very early 
on. Whereas vis-&-vis the Dutch his position was weak (in spite 
of Max Havelaar!) and clearly subordinate, vis-a-vis the Javanese 
population he remained the apex of the social order in a society 
intensely conscious of status hierarchies. While the Dutch did 
what they could (within the logic of the colonial system) to 
maintain the outward grandeur and pomp of the Bupati*s position, 
it was clear to those concerned that this was pretty much a 
sandiwara; that the ’formal' apparatus of power was quite dif­
ferent from the 'real'; that for example the controleur, though 
below the Bupati in rank and dignity,nevertheless effectively 
ran the government. A similar development had after all long 
since been in evidence in the royal capitals, where, in spite 
of the immense formal majesty and prestige of the Sunan and Sultan, 
it was everywhere understood that effective power was in the 
hands of the Rijksbestuurder or Patih, a Dutch appointee. The 
relationship contrSleur-Bupati and Patih-Sunan were in many 
respects dissimilar, but m  one critical respect they were alike - 
in their disassociation of what our scholars call charismatic 
and administrative functions. In each case the magico-religious 
figure was powerless on a day-to-day level; yet his authority 
was essential for the smooth * rking of the system controlled by 
his opposite number. Once again one detects complementarities, 
and an ambiguous, symbiotic relationship, recalling the mask and 
its wearer, the dalang and his wajang.
Although from the colonial point of view the Bupati was 
basically an official or administrator, from the Javanese point 
of view he was first and foremost the most eminent prijaji in 
his area - and prijaji is perhaps best defined as the literate 
man. The prestige of literacy in a land where illiteracy ran 
to well over 90% of the population, is at once easy and impos­
sible to comprehend. The written word assumes a character quite 
different to the literate and the illiterate man. For the one 
it is a means of communication; for the other a sign or symbol 
of an inaccessible world. The power of the Bupati was, at 
bottom, the power of literacy against illiteracy. In the language 
of the Javanese, the reflection of this "stratification" appeared, 
probably not earlier than the late 17th Century, in the structural 
differentiation between the two major levels of discourse, krama 
and ngoko. Kr&ma, par excellence the language of the prijaji, 
is a consciously archaizing Sanskritic sub-language, developed 
largely to emphasize and "build into" the larger Javanese language 
the increasing hierarchization of Javanese society under the 
influence of Dutch pressure and later control. While krama is 
essentially an honorifc language, and thus largely spoken up 
the social hierarchy, full mastery of the vocabulary requires 
a high initial degree of education. To this day social prestige 
among the Javanese is indicated most clearly by an individual's 
mastery of the finer forms of this langage de politesse. The 
rolling, melodious, polysyllabic krcbnli forms serve to emphasize
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in themselves the measuredness, sense of distance and space 
between the ranks of Javanese society. N^oko on the other hand 
is terse, acerbic, humorous and sensuous m  a direct, almost 
physical way. It is spoken down the social hierarchy and among 
very close equals, friends or family. The duality of these two 
sublanguages however does not only reflect the stratifications 
of Javanese social structure but a dualism in the Javanese mind. 
Krama is official, aspirative, and a little like a mask. Ngoko 
is private, cynical and/or humorous and a little like the heart. 
But neither can be fully appreciated without the other, and both 
"live" in their mutual complementarity.
In his relationships with the Javanese world then, the 
Bupati was bounded and conditioned by the structures of Javanese 
as a language. The values and orientations of that language 
persisted in his life since they had real application to what 
was still largely a traditional community. But in his rela­
tionship with his Dutch superiors and with his prijaji colleagues 
and equals in and outside the pamongpradja, who shared a Dutch 
education with him, the younger Bupati of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries war. compelled to leave Javanese 
behind him. The acquisition of Dutch (and also Malay, though 
Malay had a special role of its own, not in the least comparable 
to Dutch), was necessary to an adequate performance of the 
increasingly technical-managerial aspect of his role, partic­
ularly with the introduction of the Ethical Policy around the 
turn of the Century, calling for a great expansion of govern­
mental services both in the economic and social fields.
In the Indies world - as opposed to the purely Javanese - 
Dutch came thus to assume some of the functions of krama, a high 
status language which denoted the degree of the individual's 
"literacy," and in which the operations, particularly of the 
government, were most honorifically expressed.(D Whereas for 
the Dutch in Java the Dutch language remained, among themselves, 
a language without any particular nuances or prestige, it assumed 
a quite different place in the Weltanschauung of the younger 
Javanese pamongpradja. Precisely because Dutch educational 
policy, in contrast to British policy in India for example, was 
to limit the number of Dutch-speakers to what was strictly neces­
sary for the purposes of the colonial regime, Dutch acquired an 
"esoteric" aura of being the language of the inner elite, which 
it has not lost to the present day. Moreover since Dutch educa­
tion tended to be given to people of known lineage - people of 
"good family" naturally - by a reverse process, knowledge of Dutch 
was generally taken to indicate breeding and literati ancestry.
(1) One still often hears Dutch referred to jokingly as krama 
inggilnja Djakarta - the krama inggil of Djakarta. Krlimci 
inggil is a specially high-status form of krama generally 
confined to the old royal court capitals.
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It rapidly became fashionable for the younger pamongpradj a 
families to speak Dutch in their homes, often with a heavy 
Javanese accent and including many Javanese words. Particularly 
in the larger cities, among professional people, Dutch tended to 
be used also for those situations for which the older regional 
language seemed ill-adapted: for example, writing love-letters,
discussing women's fashions, and the Western amusements and 
appliances available in the metropolis.
But it was in the offices of the colonial bureaucracy that 
the political effects of the new bi-lingualism were most immedi­
ately felt. From their Dutch superiors the younger Javanese 
officials divined a new vocabulary of politics, which they 
rapidly absorbed. For the conventional colonial official, the 
world divided normally into two: praters and werkers. Praters
(talkers) were especially the politicians, parliamentarians, 
idealists, "reds" and ideologues. Werkers (doers) were busy and 
practical men of affairs, who kept their mouths shut, "ran a 
tight ship," had a strong sense of hierarchy and knew their place 
down to the last e. The division was in many ways a conventional 
pejorative distinction between administrators and politicians. 
Furthermore Dutch officialdom clearly defined their Great Society 
as consisting of Rust en Orde (Tranquillity and Order), which 
was constantly being threatened by "chaos," relletjes, o^standen, 
revolutionnaire uitbarstin^en (in ascending order of seriousness). 
Any reading of Dutch colonial literature astounds one with its 
obsessive concern with a (supposedly fragile) orde.(2) Society 
(in all serious matters) was divided between law-givers and law- 
takers, the regulators and the regulated. The politician was 
an intruder and an outsider, to be kept firmly in his place. The 
essential danger was always that the hierarchy would be disturbed(3) 
by "lower" elements making claims to power in the name of communal, 
revolutionary and/or democratic forces. The good political
state is stabiel, the bad labiel.
(2) In those palmy days it was still Orde, not yet tata-tertib 
and keamanan.
(3) Thus General Soeharto recently expressed his relief that with 
the suppression of the P.K.I. "the hierarchy - of the Revolu­
tion - would no longer be disturbed."
(4) One finds this as the basis of Alers' fascinating and much neg­
lected study of modern Indonesian politics, Om een Rode of 
Groene Merdeka, where the basic conflict is drawn between the 
"green" and "red" forces. These colours do not represent Islam 
and Communism, but rather the forces of order-rule-hierarchy 
and those of revolution-spontaneity-community. Alers' evident 
sneaking sympathy with the "reds" in no way takes away from the 
fact that the whole descriptive analysis is essentially the 
colonial administrators' political perspective stood on its 
head. These categories are neither sociologically nor 
economically rooted. They are much more projections of the 
Calvinist spirit, or the battle between Ego and Id.
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A curious osmosis or mutual acculturation took place between 
the Dutch and Javanese bureaucratic hierarchies, which can not 
be properly traced here, based on a certain communion of inter­
ests and outlooks (bureaucrats of the world unite?). In the 
19th Century, the osmosis had mainly taken the form of Javaniza- 
tion of the Dutch, most frequently in bed or in the kitchen 
through the Dutch officialfs huishoudster or "native" mistress. 
Javanese regalia and paraphernalia (golden umbrellas, Javanese 
titles, etc.) were happily adopted by Dutch administrators. In 
the 20th Century however, especially after the opening of the 
Suez Canal had permitted a massive immigration of Dutch women, 
this "Javanization" came to an end, signalized by the Van Heutsz 
Hormat Circular, which forever banned the use of Javanese ceremony 
and regalia by Dutch officials, and the rapid decline of the older 
type of inter-racial marriage. The osmosis then began to work 
the other way, with Javanese literati acquiring (mainly in Holland) 
Dutch wives, and the regalia of Dutch authority.(5)
The osmosis between Dutch and Javanese administrator was 
rendered all the easier in that certain aspects of Dutch and 
Javanese bureaucratic culture ran along surprisingly similar 
lines. The hostility of many of the older ambtenaren to the 
rising, thrusting capitalist class in the Indies, which often 
had the ear of The Hague, and which increasingly threatened the 
power-monopoly of the Binnenlands Bestuur, was not far (especially 
as the ambtenaren, in contact with the Javanese, often liked to 
assume aristocratic and pseudo-aristocratic airs) from the 
Javanese prijaji1s disdain for dagang (trade). The Dutch obses­
sion with detail, rule and rank, categorization and classifica­
tion accorded well with the Javanese prijaji love of clear 
hierarchies and the naming of the phenomena. Especially with the 
rise of the Ethical generation of Dutch administrators, steeped 
in romantic ideas of adat and the need to protect the inlander
(5) Alers has an intriguing analysis of what he calls the Mokolo 
of colonial society. The Mokolo are, apparently, the alien, 
aristocratic rule-givers of certain communities of South 
Sulawesi, whom Alers takes as the model for certain types 
of "green" rule. The Mokolo are typically a closed caste, 
filled with a 1Nietzschean1 consciousness of superiority and 
disdain for the rest of society, whom they alternately 
regulate, patronize and exploit. They do not mingle with the 
rest of society, and live by their own quite separate code, 
which is not imposed on the rest of the community. Alers 
describes the Dutch bureaucracy as typically Mokolo (the 
ultimate of "green-ness"), with race-coloration substituting 
for aristocratic-hegemonic esprit-de-corps. The 1 inner1 
bourgeois character of the Dutch colonial rule thus assumed 
an ’external1 aristocratic Mokolo character vis-a-vis the 
brown-skinned populations. Foreign observers of post-revolu­
tionary Javanese administrators in the non-Javanese islands 
have noted the trend towards Mokolo-ism in their behaviour.
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from the ravages of Westernization, mutuality was quite close.
The pamong-pradja, whose whole position rested on adat, naturally 
tended to find this outlook agreeable; and the "moraX*1 emphasis 
of Ethical rule, in which concern for what was conceived to be 
the good of the ruled, echoed older Javanese ideas about the 
duties of the ruling class. To the classical motto of the 
prijaji administrator: sepi ing pamrih, rame inggawe, mangaju-
a]unmg buwana (be disinterested, work hard, to perfect the 
world), the ainbtenaar of the Ethical school could gladly say 
Amen. Here Leiden and Jogjakarta met and fully understood one 
another. The ideal prijaji administrator, as the man who carries 
out his duty to the state m  a gentlemanly manner, with a minimum 
of (overt) ambition, elegant, polite and honorable, has more than 
superficial resemblances to the old-fashioned Ambtenaar, the man of 
eer and hoffelijkheid.
For the pamong-pradja prijaji then, the type of Dutch that 
was acquired tended m  many cases to reinforce, or at least not 
strongly disturb, traditional attitudes. The inner language of 
the Dutch civil service classified political phenomena (on the 
grand scale) in terms not too far from those already familiar 
to the Javanese civil service; the fact that the two organizations 
were functionally complementary also helped to ease the process 
of mutual assimilation, or rather, in the 20th Century, the slow 
assimilation of Javanese modes of rule to Dutch methods. On a 
smaller scale the inner vocabulary of Dutch bureaucratic intrigue 
and office gossip percolated rapidly through to the Javanese 
counterpart. The pamong-pradja official would also (rarely) 
have ruzie met zijn baas (trouble with his boss), complain that 
some colleague was erg koppig (very obstinate), shake his head 
that some too outspoken friend had been strafovergeplaatst 
(transferred to a remote station for punishment), and worry 
about the herrie (trouble) caused, say, by the unaccountable 
spread of Sarekat Islam. He might worry about het volk after 
a bad harvest, and would certainly fuss that his office be kept 
netjes with everything in orde.
The crucial aspect however of the whole bi-lingualism of 
the pamong-pradja was that in most cases it provided a means to 
cope^with the real social-political position of this class, both 
vis-a-vis Dutch superiors and Javanese subordinates. The con­
servatism of the pamong-pradja as a group, the fact that their 
interests lay in defending an older and established order, also 
meant that it was easy to absorb out of the Dutch universe only 
what was essential to buttress the gaps in the Javanese universe.
In this respect Dutch played a fulfilling and adaptive role, with 
Javanese remaining the dominant "mode" in the official mind. With 
no mission to fulfil except the maintenance of an existing order, 
the pamongpradja class was able to make a much more 1 stable* 
adjustment to its own bilingualism, and undergo far less psycho­
logical stress in the process, than the nationalist intellec­
tual class. Nonetheless, since the great majority of the younger 
nationalist intelligentsia was intimately related to the pamon^- 
pradja, and indeed simply formed one part of the larger prijaji
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class, the experience of the older generation pamongpradja formed 
a bridge between the purely Javanese experience and that of the 
nationalist revolution. Rather than simply absorb and adapt 
Dutch ’partially’, to reinforce Javanese traditions, the younger 
intelligentsia, drawn mainly from the professions, was to build 
on the alder generation’s experience, and advance to the radical 
absorption of Dutch as a ’’whole" - including the metropolitan 
spectrum of Dutch culture - and consequently in the long run to 
destroy Dutch colonial power from within.
The Nationalist Intelligentsia
Whereas the pamong-pradja was to the end well-adapted to 
the maintenance and continuation of Dutch rule, it was very early 
recognized by colonial conservatives that even the limited Dutch- 
language education provided by the colonial authorities was 
creating a new class of Indonesians (Javanese in our case), 
unprecedented in Javanese history and whose very existence presaged 
the end of Dutch rule. This group of so-called half-intellectuelen, 
gladakkers, ruziemakers, even sloebers, was contrasted in the 
Dutch colonial mind with a sentimentalized adel (nobility) and 
eenvoudige tani’s (uncorrupted peasants), who served the regime 
m  a more or less ’mystified’ way.
For these intellectuals, without a real function within the 
structures of the colonial system, but the potential leaders of 
a post-colonial society, bi-lingualism was not the key to a 
"modernization" of regional tradition. It opened the way to a 
critical conception of colonial society as a whole, and a possible 
vision of a society after the disappearance of the colonial regime 
itself, be it in the simplest and most abstract terms. It is 
here that the role of Dutch was of crucial importance: it provided 
the necessary means of communication between the anti-imperialist 
and anti-colonial critiques of West European and later Russian 
Marxism and the potential revolutionary elite in Indonesia. This 
process is of course a commonplace of colonial studies. What is 
often insufficiently stressed is the clarity of this revolutionary 
social-democratic mode of thinking within the mystagogic colonial 
literature: its coherence, simplicity, organization, and compre­
hensiveness vis-a-vis the factitious (and real) discontinuities 
and "complications" of racial division, adat particularity, 
religious schism, etc., which made any attempt to think in a 
totalist way about Dutch power so difficult within the framework 
of the regional languages, even ones as highly organized as 
Javanese. Just because Dutch power was wider than any "ethnic- 
linguistic" group, and spread deeper than the stratification of 
traditional society, it could only be responded to within terms 
which it laid down itself. The mode of comprehension was there­
fore necessarily Dutch; the mode of onslaught and attack was 
subsequently to be Indonesian (Revolutionary Malay). The spread 
of Indonesian as a national language was impossible, paradoxically,
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except once Dutch had been developed as the inner language of 
the intelligentsia: only thus could Indonesian be developed to
receive a frame of reference and a formed and coherent 
Weltanschauung, ready for further diffusion within colonial 
society.
It can be safely said that whereas openly "conservative"
Dutch thinking had virtually no impact whatever on Indonesians 
(the disguised conservatism of the Ethici of course did have 
significance in pamongpradja circles), Dutch socialist and 
communist writing affected virtually the whole of the intel­
ligentsia of the f20s and f30s. For this reason a socialist- 
communist vocabulary became the common property of the entire 
nationalist elite of those years. It is important however to 
stress that this vocabulary was basically "dual" in that it 
provided at once a critique of the existing order and a program 
for its replacement, which though within the West European 
framework (possibly) inseparable, once outside that environment 
were quite easily disassociated. Precisely because the critique 
offered by Marxism was brilliantly apt, and ruthlessly "clear," 
it was taken over wholeheartedly by all important segments of 
the elite. The subsequent Marxist program was neither terribly 
apt nor in the least clear, especially across cultures, and so 
remains ambiguous to the present day. While the Marxist 
criticism of colonial society was based on the observed facts 
of that society, the futuresprofferred by Marxism were based on 
very little which had meaning in itself for the literati of 
Java; and the meaningfulness of Marxism as a practice varied 
largely according to the real degree of assimilation to Dutch 
culture and the Dutch language.
All Indonesian intellectuals of the T20s and f30s were posed 
the problems of cultural and spiritual dualism in their harshest 
forms. Rare indeed was it to find anyone who could hold the 
two universes completely separate or in balance. There was a 
general tendency for the weight of individuals personality 
to be laid on either the Dutch or the regional-traditional "leg." 
Those who rested on the Dutch "leg" came to find that dialogue 
and intercourse with the Dutch enemy was easier than with the 
provincial and rural Indonesian masses. Many of them lived for 
at least some years in Holland and in Europe. Many also became 
active members of the Dutch Left, whether as socialists or com­
munists. On their return, it was common for them to adopt a 
political strategy of "cadre-forming" among Dutch-educated younger 
intellectuals to whom they could talk in the same general language 
that they had used with their Dutch socialist or communist counter­
parts. It was no coincidence that the strategy of the Hatta- 
Sjahrir group in the early thirties was thus devoted to building 
up an elite circle of Dutch-speaking "radical" intellectuals. 
Needless to say, neither intellectual ever had any 
significant mass support. On the other side there were
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intellectuals whose assimilation of Dutch was much more super­
ficial, who had few close relationships with Dutchmen, and 
who felt more comfortable within the traditionalist milieu 
than in the "international" socialist-communist intellectual 
world. For such men the determining experience of life was 
not the "break-through" into internationalist "modernism."
The fact was that for them political action became meaningful 
and successful not through dialogue with the Dutch, but with 
their own regional traditionally-minded communities. Whereas 
intellectuals in the first group were closer to like-minded 
Dutchmen than unlike-minded Javanese or Sundanese, the reverse 
was the case with the second group. To a large extent, though 
acting as intermediaries of "outside" ideas down into the 
traditional world, they never moved effectively or comfortably 
outside it. For this reason the natural line of political 
strategy was the mobilization of the masses, within an intel­
lectual universe largely incomprehensible to the Dutch. Pre­
cisely because this was their strength, their grip on pro­
grammatic Marxism remained extremely weak - indeed the conscious 
dilemmas of post-revolutionary Indonesia with regard to the 
organization of her future results largely from this fact.(6)
Nonetheless, the two groups abstracted in this analysis 
(actually there were no such groups, but a whole range of 
personalities between the two polar "types") were united by 
the language of the colonial ruler. Since it was the school 
language of this whole generation of intellectuals which grew 
up before the Japanese Occupation, it remained the inner lang­
uage of elite discourse, especially between nationalists of 
different ethnic groups. It was the medium for thinking about 
and absorbing ideas and institutions from the West (including 
Russia) which promised to liberate and elevate the peoples 
of Indonesia from the grip of their white masters. It also 
built up elite cohesion vis-a-vis the Dutch and the indigenous 
masses. And because, as mentioned previously, Dutch education 
was largely given to the children of prijaji (even upper level 
prijaji) families, it was subsequently to appear as a sort of 
diploma of high status within traditional society. To this day 
the vague line dividing those who are binnen (inT and those who 
are buiten (out) in Djakarta politics remains fluency in the 
colonial language.
In spite of the elite's full or partial mastery of Dutch, 
the colonial government's educational policies made it clear
(6) One could say that the difference lay between those who
basically 'thought' in Dutch and those who, however fluent 
their Dutch, subconsciously translated as thev went along 
from the structures of their own regional languages. Later, 
as we shall see, both translated into Indonesian, Sjahrir from 
Dutch and Sukarno from Javanese. This is made strikingly clear 
in Sjahrir's Perdjuangan Kita (November 1945) and Sukarno's 
Lahirnja Pantjasila ( June 1945)^ neither of which are fully 
comprehensible without the reader knowing something of the 
mother-tongues involved.
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that there would be no possibility of using Dutch (as English 
was used in India) to unite the regional nationalisms into a 
solid anti-Dutch front. A language had to be found which 
could be used across the complications of ethnic and status 
lines to fulfil the unifying function at the mass level which 
Dutch performed among the elite. The language would thus, since 
it was called into being by the nationalist struggle, represent 
in itself the pure spirit of resistance to the domineering 
monopoly of Dutch as the bridge to "modernity.” It would 
in itself declare the cultural defeat of centuries of Dutch 
rule.
As is very well known, pasar (market) Malay had long been 
the lingua franca of the archipelago, and this became the 
basis of an essentially political language, Indonesian (Revo­
lutionary Malay). It was a language simple and flexible 
enough to be rapidly developed into a modern political language, 
analogous but, as it were, verso to Dutch, without strong 
tradTtTonal traits (mainly syntax and honorofics) exercising 
their own contradictory influences. This was all the more 
possible because Malay as an "inter-ethnic" language, or 
lingua franca, had ipso facto an almost statusless character, 
like Esperanto, and was tied to no particular regional social 
structure. It had thus a free, almost "democratic" character 
from the outset, which had its own appeal to an intellectual 
class, which at one level (the desire to be on equal terms 
with the colonial elite) aspired to egalitarian norms.(?) It 
has often been said (mainly by the Javanese of a later day) 
that the adoption of Indonesian as the national language was 
a magnanimous concession on the part of the Javanese near­
majority. It seems more likely however that, since even for 
the more traditionally oriented intellectuals the drive for 
modernity was at that time still partly seen in terms of 
breaking out of "Javanism" and the hierarchical modes of Java­
nese social intercourse, the simple modalities of Indonesian 
had their own ideological appeal. The language moreover of­
fered the possibility of relating sociallv in an essentially 
Dutch manner, but without the mediation of the Dutch language.
The very awkwardness and unfamiliarity of the new language 
reflected the sense of creativity and exploration of a "socialist” 
and would-be egalitarian experience. Being at once "national" 
and modern it was able to satisfv, at least in part, both 
ideological requirements and the need for a sense of cultural 
identity within a common enterprise.
(7) The inter-ethnic character of the language made it all the 
more successful as an unifier, since it was not tied in 
with the interests of any major ethnic-linguistic group 
in the struggle for inter-regional ascendancy.
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The Adventures of a New Language
The major public function of Indonesian and its key 
political significance has lain in its role as national unifier 
Though it began to play this part in the 1920’s it was not 
until the Japanese Occupation that it formally became the 
National Language, to be taught in schools and used in offices 
as a matter of official policy• And during the Revolution it 
was above all the language of resistance to the returning 
Dutch and the language of hope for the future. The Revolution 
also started the process of filling Indonesian with the emotion 
ally resonant words which give any language its cultural 
identity and aura, and which seem to express its speakers1 
most intimate experience. The key words Rakjat (People), 
Merdeka (Freedom), perdjuangan (struggle), gerakan (movement), 
kebangsaan (nationality)^Icedaulatan (sovereigntvT, se man gat 
(dynamic spirit), and above all Revolusi: all stem from
the seedtime of the Republic, the time of its most violently 
anguished awareness of itself as the expression of a hopeful 
new enterprise and solidarity. Virtually all the emotive words 
in Indonesian are centred round the struggle and violence of 
the physical revolution and almost all have highly political- 
heroic connotations. They live and vibrate because they are 
part of the historical memory of a still surviving generation, 
and were "coined" within the most important experience of 
modern Indonesian life. The contrast with Javanese, where 
the emotive words, sonorous and onomatopoeic, have grown in 
depth and resonance over generations, on a withdrawn aesthetic 
and religious level, is striking.
Aside from the key words born of the Revolution and the 
struggle that preceded it, Indonesian is a language without 
extensive historical memories and connotations to it. It 
looks to the future, and as such it is par excellence the 
language of youth and rebellion. For the majority of literary 
artists too, who feel the oppressiveness of the Dutch and 
Javanese literary traditions, Indonesian offers an attractive 
medium of expression. Its very flatness and simplicity allow 
writers to feel that they can create and mould it in their 
own image and according to their own aspirations. But though 
for the chosen few Indonesian’s lack of "given-ness" creates 
a sense of liberation, both literary and political, there has 
always been an underlying cultural risk involved. Especially 
since the Revolution the language’s lack of cultural resonances 
of a solid tradition, has led to considerable transformation 
of the language, as we shall see below.
Furthermore, precisely because Indonesian represented 
in essence a "project", an aspiration to unity and equality, 
a generous wager on the future - in the face of some increas­
ingly intractable social facts - the language has gradually 
developed a "formal" character which has till now scarcely 
been commented upon. Modern Indonesian has something curiously 
impersonal and neuter about it, which sets up psychological
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distances between its speakers* This is not because of any 
social stratification lfbuilt into” the language, but, para­
doxically, because of its democratic-egalitarian character 
in a society still so largely and traditionally status-oriented 
in its deepest thinking. (By contrast, the extremely strati­
fied modalities of Javanese create a strong sense of communal 
identity!) The vitality of Indonesian depending less on its 
historical antecedents than its symbolic character as an 
expression of the anti-colonial project (at once the unifi­
cation of the whole former Dutch colonial empire into a 
harmonious nation, the democratization of the national com­
munity and the growth of a free spirit of fraternity), the 
post-revolutionary fate of this project has had decisive 
effects on the language. Forming a new and thin topsoil to 
the cultures of Indonesia, it has proved only too liable to 
suffer erosion once the winds of change began to blow.
The development of the language in the post-revolutionary 
period shows clear signs that this has been happening. It is 
not so much that the language acquires a new vocabulary as 
such (though this indeed is also occurring) but that the older 
words acquire a ’satanic1 reversed meaning, expressing almost 
geologically the transitions from the hopeful years of the 
revolution to the harsher, grimmer years that have followed.
The most celebrated example of this has been the fate of the 
word bung, which has suffered a kind of amoebic fission.
During the Revolution the word bung (brother) expressed the 
real fraternity of the national struggle, and was used freely 
by all active participants in that struggle. Today, with the 
exception of a few national figures like Sukarno, Hatta and 
Sutomo, (and in their case bung is spelt Bung), virtually 
no one of importance is referred to in this way (outside small 
nostalgic leftist cliques). While the Bung half of bung has 
stayed high and honorific, the lower bung half has slipped 
lower and lower, and is now generallv a peremptory, disdainful 
means of summoning an oplet-driver, waiter, doorman or street 
cigarette-seller. Another example is the word aksi, which in 
the heyday of Tan Malakafs Massa Aksi meant Action, Revolu­
tionary Mass Action, and even now crops up in the names of 
such organizations as KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia 
- Indonesian Students1 Action Union). More often today, however 
it is the satanic reversed meaning of aksi which is widespread, 
in the sense of a ’’show” (pretentious, fake, artificial). Such 
further examples could readily be provided. The point is not 
that these words are used cynically, but precisely that they 
are not. People use Bung and bung, Aksi and aksi, quite unself­
consciously, in their disassociated meanings.
This fission within some of the most important emotive 
words of the Indonesian language reflects both sociological 
and metaphysical characteristics of post-revolutionary Indonesia 
It represents the re-stratification of contemporary Indonesian
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society, and the metaphysical determination to maintain the 
aspirations and idealism of Indonesian in a changing social 
context by a traditional process of (so to speak) "dualization" 
and disassociation.
This is revealed all the more clearly when one takes into 
account that even today, twenty years after the Revolution, 
Indonesian is by no means the everyday language of more than 
a tiny segment of the population. One can say with some con­
fidence that in fact in only two cities in all Indonesia is 
Indonesian the normal medium of communication outside official 
channels. The great provincial capitals, Makassar, Padang, 
Palembang, Bandung, Surabaja, Solo and Semarang, all speak 
their own regional languages - be it Makassarese, Minangkabau, 
Sundanese or Javanese. Only in Medan and Djakarta is Indonesian 
the real urban language. Even here, Medanese is really, for 
historical reasons, more "Malay" than Indonesian, and has much 
of the character of a provincial dialect.
It is only in the melting pot of Djakarta that Indonesian 
has developed and shown its creativity in the post-revolution­
ary years. This has partly been a product of an immense 
influx of fortune-seekers, especially from Java, but also from 
all the other islands, into a Capital where so much power and 
wealth is concentrated. It also reveals the peculiar personality 
of Djakarta, its sense of solidarity vis-a-vis the daerah and 
the rapid, brutal, commercial, power-oriented and humorous 
character of metropolitan life. The main aspect of Djakarta's 
influence on Indonesian has been the growing incorporation of 
the so-called bahasa Djakarta, or at least major parts of it, 
into the national language.
Bahasa Djakarta or bahasa Betawi has long been in exis- 
tence, developed over decades by Balinese, Sundanese, Buginese, 
Javanese and Chinese settlers there. It is a rough, urban, 
lower-class speech, totally without "high" moral or aspirative 
traits. It is virtually impossible to be "serious" or even 
"pompous" in bahasa Djakarta, so brutally earthy, direct and 
humorous is the language. By an unexpected turn of history 
however, this lumpen-language has increasingly become the "in" 
language of the Djakarta elite, especially in the later fifties 
and sixties. Particularly for the younger generation of politi­
cians, officials and students,bahasa Djakarta, in slightly 
refined form, has become a normal mode of social intercourse.
Its popularity clearly derives from its intimate, jazzy, cynical 
character, which forms a satisfying counter-point to the formal, 
official Indonesian of public communication. It provides an "id" 
for Indonesian's "ego." It expresses the danger, excitement, 
humour and coarseness of the new Djakarta as no other language 
could do. Its harsh, acrid onomatopoeia parallels the flavour 
of ngoko in Javanese, while bahasa Indonesia grows more and more 
into a~Form of krama.
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The most interesting external manifestation of this is the 
metropolitan newspaper, which, for our purposes, can be divided 
into two quite clearly separable portions. First, the portion 
in kahasa Indonesia, which covers all news items, all features, 
and all editorials (about 95% of the newsprint). Second, the 
portion in bahasa Djakarta, which covers only the podjok. Though 
the Podjok rarely run more than half a column, they are normally 
the first "thing in the paper that the Djakarta reader turns to. 
The essence of the podjok is biting, anonymous comment on the 
latest news or the general political or economic situation.
Often they will indirectly refer to events which are "open 
secrets11, though the censorship will not permit them to be 
mentioned elsewhere. The podjok frequently take the form of 
dialogues between two (supposed) proletarians or petty traders: 
Bang Dul, Pak Otong, etc., etc. The art of podjok-writing is 
one of allusion, innuendo, sarcasm, mock surprise, poker-faced 
apophthegms, and dot-dot-dot, almost impossible to convey in 
another language. But as a simple example, a podjok may quote 
a senior Minister or Army officer making an uplifting speech 
in Indonesian about the need to live simply, avoid corruption 
and work hard. On a separate line comes the rejoinder: Bener
deh! (Quite right). Evidently a simple agreement with wh*at 
"the great man has said. But the metropolitan reader immediately 
notes that the podjok-writer has used the Djakarta bener not 
the Indonesian Senar (bener has strong come-off-it connotations), 
and has added the untrarislateable but salty particle deh 
(something likefindeed1) which is typically Djakarta and 
pithily expresses sarcasm, ridicule and disbelief. In just 
two words then, the podjok formally praises the Minister or 
Officer, while at the same time implying that he is hypocriti­
cal, lazy, corrupt and pompous. Or again the podjok may simply 
say: Hasilnje ade djuga. Ikan gede ketangkap. Alhamdulillah!
(It finally worked. They got a big fish. Praise be!). from 
the sarcastic "Praise be!" and the Djakarta suffixes, the 
reader will immediately know or guess that an important politi­
cal figure has been arrested for corruption, though the case 
itself, and even the arrest, may never be made public.
The contrast between the Indonesian and Djakartan sections 
of the newspapers is complete and immediate. The Indonesian 
parts are high-minded, serious, and moralizing, usually sermons 
by the President, Generals, Ministers or editors. They are 
doubtless very improving, but also official, aspirative, ideo­
logical, patronizing and authoritarian. All are directed down 
the social-political hierarchy from the Great to the Small, from 
the pemimpin (leader) or tokoh (bigshot) to the rakjat (people), 
wong tjTlTk "(the little man) or the massa (the masses). The 
Djakarta parts are snide, corrosive, democratic, humorous and 
afioveiall intimate. The empty distances of Indonesian are 
immediately scaled down to the knowing intimacy of Djakarta.
As the Djakarta-speakers put it, it conveys a pervasive atmos­
phere Qr T'^ (tahu sama tahu - we understand each other).
It is not just the inflections which are in striking contrast
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it is also the vocabulary itself. The editorials centre round 
words like: imperialisme , pembangunan (upbuilding), kemadjuan
(progress), amanat penderitaan rakjat "(message of the peopleTs 
sufferings), kontra-revolusioner (counter-revolutionary) and 
perdjuangan (struggle). fhe podfjok speak in terms of: masuk
kantong (filling one's pockets), sepak ke atas (kick upstairs), 
njatut (to chisel), djatuh ke kasur (fall on a mattress - i.e., 
be removed from office but be given a fat sinecure as consolation 
prize), main kaju (playing it rough and dirty) and ngakunje 
(so he claims). The editorial may speak of demokratis (democratic) 
- the podjok echoes it as dia mau gratis (he wants it for 
nothing).
The question arises therefore as to what is really taking 
place with this emergence of Djakarta as a key element in the 
metropolitan language of politics. It is clearly unprecedented 
in Indonesian history in its terminology, which derives from 
the post-independence situation, where Indonesians control 
their own government, and rulers and ruled (higher-level ruled) 
engage in some form of intimate dialogue. There is the temp­
tation to regard Djakarta as the ,freal,f language, the "in" 
language, while Indonesian is merely for show, propaganda or 
self-aggrandizement. The cynical wit of the podjok and of the 
metropolitan gossip network are easy enough to take as the 
"reality” until one recognizes that Djakarta is still the 
language of one city, with virtually no roots outside, and that 
for the great mass of Indonesians at all involved in politics, 
Indonesian retains its hold as the symbol and promise of the 
future, and has a reality which transcends the hopes and fears 
of the present elite.
We are back with the problem of the mask. Public mask, 
and private face, which is real? Why is the mask so important?
What is the private face without the public mask? Does the 
mask mislead, attract, symbolize or possess?
Javanese Modalities and the Present Cultural Crisis
The deepening crisis which has preoccupied all politicallv- 
minded Indonesians since at least as far back as 1956 (that is 
now for almost a decade), while many-faceted, centres psycho­
logically and culturally on the petering out of the earlier 
revolutionary impulse within the revolutionary elite. Socio­
logically it is manifested in the growing stratification of 
Indonesian society, the increasing isolation of the elite from 
the masses, and the development of parasitic bureaucratic 
structures in all fields of social activity. Politically the 
slow narrowing of the government's political base, the uncrea- 
tive conservatism of its policies, and the ever more frantic 
effort to protect its own vested interests reflects the same 
condition. The economic situation is in no way more promising. 
The impact of these changes on the language of Indonesian
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politics and Indonesian nationalism has been of great importance. 
Part of what has been happening has been an inevitable process of 
Javanization of Indonesian, both in terms of vocabulary and in 
terms of modalities. Part of it has been the drying up Indonesian 
(Revolutionary Malay) as a well-spring for renewed social crea­
tivity, Very probably the most important development has been 
this last: the slowdown of the revolutionary essor at the centre
of Indonesian politics. But the two are intertwined, the rela­
tive ascendancy of Indonesian and Javanese is in itself an in­
dicator of the internal psychological and metaphysical state of 
the nation and of the general road down which the Indonesian 
elite has been heading. Given the growing paralysis of the 
revolutionary impulse, "revolutionary" Indonesian has been in­
creasingly felt as "out of touch," almost dysfunctional to 
communication within the emerging system. The only mode for 
grappling linguistically with this change has been to rely more 
heavily on an older, more elaborate, and possibly more enduring 
tradition. The problem is not, as has been so often vulgarly 
expressed, the cultural imperialism of the Javanese, but the 
impending defeat of Indonesian (for the nonce at least), not as 
a language, but as an autonomous modality of thought. The 
Indonesia-thinkers have been few and far between, and have not 
been able to impose this mode of being as such on the political 
public.
The Javanization of Indonesian has a number of facets to it, 
all of which are closely connected to the objective social and 
political situation.
1. The kramanization of public Indonesian. As the "reality" 
of revolutionary Indonesian has increasingly been undercut by 
events, official Indonesian has tended to become a language of 
political politeness, in which any educated modern prijaji should 
be fluent, and which in effect separates him from the rakTJat 
jang bodoh.(8) This "etiquette" helps to disassociate the prijaji 
m  at least part of his spirit from the rawer crudities, and 
to maintain contact with the more ideal, halus aspects of con­
temporary politics. The acquisition of the vocabulary of 
Indonesia krama in itself involves a form of inwijding, or initia- 
tion into a higher level of political sophistication and civiliza­
tion. It is a kind of spiritual self-discipline in itself to 
become fully aware of the nuances and ambiguities of the public 
language.
(8) The newcomer is often struck by the unselfconsciousness with 
which the prijaji (even ’leftist1 prijaji) refer to the 
’masses' as bodoh,since this word is usually translated as 
’stupid.' It seems intolerable snobbery, and indeed often 
is. But when one hears the same man talking about the people 
as masih bodoh (still stupid), the difficulty becomes clear. 
For the West stupidity is determined, and is a trait of a 
"fixed" personality. We never talk of people being ’still 
stupid.' For the Javanese ’stupidity’ is the reverse of being 
’educated* or ’awakened.’ It is therefore a failing which can 
(in theory) always be remedied.
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Just as krama itself originally represented a literary- 
religious glorifying and archaizing of the basic ngoko vocabulary, 
one finds that the kramanization of bahasa Indonesia naturally 
turns in the same direction, at once both by glorification and 
archaism, which, as always, is intended to link and identify the 
present with the heroic past. The archaisms and honorifics tend 
to come from Javanese and Old Javanese, since both for sonority 
and for glorious historical resonances these two languages form 
the richest treasury. Thus Pantjasila, Indonesia’s ’modern1 
political ideology*was originally a set of Buddhist principles, 
mentioned in the earliest known Javanese epic, the Nagarakrtagama. 
The modern krama name for the Mobile Brigade of the Police, 
Bhayangkari, is the same as that used in Old Javanese for ’Palace 
Guard.’ The Sapta Marga, ideological charter of the Indonesian 
Army, is again Old Javanese for the Seven Paths. There are 
dozens of these archaisms now current under late Guided Democracy: 
Tri Ubaja Sakti, Pantjatunggal, Pantjawardhana, Mandala, Satya 
Lent3ana, Pramuka, etc. etc. Many of them are true krchn£ words 
m  that there are ’ordinary’ or ngoko everyday equivalents:
(e.g. Mobrig for Bhayangkari). All of them tend to be used most 
on occasions of high ceremonial importance, and to be applied to 
objects and institutions of the highest political prestige.
While almost none of these words are understood fully in their 
original sense, the fact that they are of Sanskritic or Old 
Javanese origin is well understood, and therefore the modern 
institutions are seen as inheriting the prestige and majesty 
of the originals.
2. The new ngoko. It has already been suggested above that 
bahasa Djakarta has at least partially been absorbed into political 
Indonesian to perform the role of ngoko, as Revolutionary Malay 
has gradually moved up to krama status. This is undoubtedly the 
case, and shows how Javanese modalities have penetrated Indonesian 
even more than Javanese as a language. But it is also true that 
there has been a steady influx of ngoko Javanese words into 
Indonesian at all levels (almost none from contemporary Javanese 
krama). This partly reflects the actual and growing power of the 
Javanese, and especially Sukarno, at the centre of Indonesian 
politics since 1956. Since Sukarno and the P.K.I. (also heavily 
Javanese) have been the only two consciously creative or innova­
tive forces in developing the modern language of Indonesian 
politics, this verbal Javanization (which is now even quite 
fashionable) shows its ancestry rather clearly. The most well- 
known Javanese imports, words like: ganjang (eat up), krumus
(chew up), gontok-gontokan (brawling), nggrogoti (undermine by 
gnawing), bobrok (hopelessly rotten), plintat-plintut (half­
hearted), berkiprah (strut in victory), not only have the typical 
Javanese sensual immediacy (by onomatopoeia), but are almost 
invariably words implying danger, disaster and physical violence. 
This in turn is unmistakably a sign of the deepening social 
conflicts and tensions of the past decade, as the economic and
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social plight of the Javanese has become markedly worse, and as 
hatreds have been turned inward on the society itself rather 
than on the outside world.
3. The neutralization or capture of revolutionary symbols. 
This can be described as the process of assimilating those sym­
bols to an unrevolutionary, even anti-revolutionary tradition­
alism. It is done in two ways:
(a) by burying words of great symbolic power like revolusi, 
sosialisme, demokrasi, which have real historic roots, within 
hermetic acronyms like Resopim, Djarek, Usdek. These combina­
tion-words are not 1 functional1 m  the sense that sovkhoz or Nep 
once were - convenient abbreviations for practical policies and 
concrete institutions. They are what one could half-paradoxically 
call synthetic syntheses of ideas which may have neither con­
crete reality or communality, but which by verbal manipulation 
may be thought to acquire a life of their own. Djalan Revolusi 
Kita (The Course of Our Revolution) is still an attempt to use 
words syntactically to convey an idea or an appeal. Djarek 
however is not a word at all, but quite literally a thing, into 
which the ingredient *revolusi* has been stirred. It has become
a mantra in which the overt meaning is of no importance. In 
Western eyes it has been reduced to one of the Charms (Azimat) 
of the Revolution. Looked at somewhat differently, it represents 
a transformation of alien symbols and messages, precisely parallel 
to what we have observed happening to Arabic and Islam in older 
times. Like Arabic the external language of revolutionary 
socialism has been taken over and given an esoteric sense, 
scarcely connected at all to its overt sense. The esoteric 
sense is to be grasped largely by intuition. The acquisition 
by rote of the newer acronyms thus forms an exact parallel to 
the learning of the incomprehensible ajat of the Koran in the 
pesantren; it is part of a spiritual training. We can attribute 
quite similar functions to Usdek or Takari and the formula 
Bismillahirochanirochim.(9)
(b) by "reifying" action and process into essence and quality. 
Sukarno has constantly been accused by his Western judges of
*betrayingT socialism, democracy and revolution. What many 
have failed to realize is that these words are no longer trans­
lations of sosialisme, demokrasi and revolusi, which have now 
independent"^ f r e e - f 1 o a ting meanings of their own. When 
Lieutenant-General Soeharto talks quite seriously of "the
(9) Thus the use of these mantra should be seen neither as "magic^ 
as certain Gallic commentators have supposed, nor as hypo­
critical sloganizing^as too many of our economic missionaries 
have insisted, but as something like prayer, in the sense 
used by Jim Siegel in the first article of this issue.
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hierarchy of the revolution being disturbed," or refers (not in 
the least cynically) to the Communists as "counter-revolutionary" 
and "liberal," it is clear that these words have an esoteric 
sense all their own. Revolution is no longer a social process 
but a state of mind, or a combat record. One may "be" revolu­
tionary (ex officio, by having participated in the nationalist 
struggle) or '’become" revolutionary (by "mental retooling" as 
General Nasution puts it so elegantly - i.e. by having one’s' 
mental wavelength changed) but one does not "act" revolutionary. 
What is socially approved is a state of mind, not a series of 
deeds. Similarly, the official can simultaneously loudly applaud 
the slogan-phrase gotong-rojong (mutual help and cooperation) and 
denounce the slogan-phrase sama rata sama rasa (all equal in 
status, all feeling equal). This is because sama rata sama rasa 
(popular in leftist circles) still retains its original meaning, 
while gotong-rojong has been reified into the-word-for-the- 
present-mode-of-government. Ipso facto then, gotong-rojong is 
desirable and practised.
A similar process is at work in the transformation of words 
like demokrasi and sosialisme. We fall into a nominalist heresy 
when we identify socialism and democracy as things Which Are - 
they are only what we make them. If we were to imagine the 
adventures of the Indonesian idea of musjawarah or the Javanese 
idea of gotong-rojong, once taken over by the American educational 
establishment and inculcated into the younger generation of 
Americans, we can come to a much more serious conception of the 
whole trend to absorb and transform the Western concepts of 
modern politics within Indonesian-Javanese mental structures*
In any such cross-cultural confrontation, the inevitable thrust 
is to "appropriate" the foreign concept and try to anchor it 
safely to given or traditional ways of thinking and modes of 
behaviour. Depending on the conceptions of the elite and its 
determination, either the imported ideas and modalities or the 
traditional ones assume general ascendancy: in most large and
non-Communist societies it is almost invariable that, at least 
in the short run, the traditional modalities tend to prevail.
H. Javanese images of politics. It has been frequently 
argued that the Javanese sense of history is cyclical and not 
linear, and my own feeling is that in general this is true. At 
least where we tend to look for parallels, many Javanese look 
for reiterations or reflections. The subject is an exceedingly 
complicated one, which can not be dealt with satisfactorily in 
this essay; nevertheless it is worth considering what for example 
is the fate of the idea of Revolution within a cyclical (but 
is not Revolution basically a cyclical image?) intuition of 
history. Does it not really end up in Dr. Subandrio’s "revolution 
is continuity!?"(10) in the classical cycles of Javanese his­
toriography, the golden age of the distant past gradually
(10) As cited from Lance Castles’ article in this issue.
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disintegrates into successively lower and more miserable eras, 
culminating in the era of disaster, the Kaliyuga or Djaman £dan 
(The Age of Madness) in which all values are transvalued, all 
social institutions turned upside down, and society is broken 
apart. But the wheel of ti®e continues to revolve, and out of 
the darkness of the Djaman Edan, a new golden age begins again 
under a new Ratu Adil (Just King). Here is "revolution is 
continuity" with a vengeance! The metaphors of cycle and 
revolution come together without too great a shock within this 
larger perspective. Sukarno’s Sosialisme a la Indonesia is much 
closer in every way to the Djaman Mas (Golden Age) than it is 
to Marx’s classless society. It is a restoration above all: 
the old order re-emerging in technical, modern dress; the golden 
age at a much higher level of average income per capita, but 
with the older verities and structures scarcely altered.
The Javanese image of the components of their own society 
is another case in point. The dominant division is undoubtedly 
between the aliran (stromingen, streams), and not between classes 
or even political- persuasions. The aliran are basically dis­
continuous mental universes and ways of life, which flow across 
class lines, and can not be easily subsumed under the rubric 
ideology. They lie under the political parties but are not of 
them. The NU, PSII, Perti, can all be seen as part of the Islamic 
or santri aliran, for example, but that aliran includes quite 
non-political peasants, teachers, traders, etc. There is (still) 
a communist aliran (part of a larger abangan aliran) and a 
prijaji-nationalist aliran. The division of the community by 
aliran is a peculiarly Javanese ’analysis’ of society, which is 
increasingly imposed upon Indonesia’s own internal view of her 
politics. Yet these aliran are (and this in spite of the present 
brutal massacres perpetrated against the communists) "givens’* in 
the Javanese political landscape. There is no real expectation 
(pace General Nasution) that they are anything but permanent 
aspects of Javanese society, sometimes up, sometimes down, but 
part of an ongoing order.
Finally there is the image of the mask and the puppet, which 
we have alluded to at intervals throughout this discussion. The 
ostensible vocabulary of Indonesian political language has in­
creasingly been dominated in recent years with words which 
explicitly or implicitly evoke these images: <lalang, mendalangi,
wajangnja, lakon, ^ara-gara, prang tanding, djedjer, Bratajuda,~ 
Durna, are all political words drawn from the language and universe 
of the shadow-play. Kedok (mask), as used in phrases like terbuka 
kedoknja, dengan kedok..., refer to the images of the mask, both 
m  the topeng mask-danceand in the dualistic structures of 
Javanese social relationships. These are all terms which have a 
special resonance for the Javanese, indeed the words themselves 
are almost all Javanese in origin. So deeply imbedded are these 
images in the Javanese mind that conceptions of the "game of 
politics" are invariably coloured by them. It is very hard for
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Javanese, and increasingly for all metropolitan Indonesians, to 
believe in any form of political spontaneity - in the accidental 
or fortuitous. Something is always going on "behind the screen" 
where unseen dalang are at work. The public "appearance" of the 
great is always regarded, less with cynicism than with the faith 
that to some extent at least it is a mask. The obsession with 
intrigue, with the sandiwara (stageplay) of politics, even with 
the aesthetic side of political behaviour (the art of playing 
politics) are characteristic of a view of politics in which 
virtu (adeptness) in sudden transformations and role reversals 
is an accepted political value. Politics as elaborate and magni­
ficent drama, rather than as a process for the attainment of 
specific ends and the satisfaction of concrete interests - this 
is a viewpoint which at least in its symbolism derives from the 
central role of traditional religious drama (wajang) in the 
Javanese experience.(ID
But here perhaps we can see also that Indonesian (and perhaps 
'modernity1) is having its revenge. For though the image of the 
mask is as powerful as ever, its ambiguity appears to be declining. 
This is, historically, the result of the buffeting which the 
older traditional conceptions of opposites as complementarities 
and as expressions of an underlying continuum are receiving in 
contemporary Indonesian conditions. There is a growing uncertainty 
about the relationship between the seen and the unseen, the real 
and the Real. The idea of the mask thus increasingly becomes 
purely and simply the idea of a factitious disguise for a hidden 
purpose, worn to deceive or to conceal a truth. The growing 
popularity of words to describe "hypocrisy": munafik, gadungan,
sok, palsu, plintat-plintut, bermukadua is thus significant. All 
these words imply a single Real reality, which is being betrayed 
by hypocritical and two-faced elements. Thus the language and 
imagery of Javanese tradition here survive, but within an 
Indonesian-Western modality which has largely stripped it of its 
metaphysical richness.
To conclude then, it appears that the languages of Indonesian 
politics are approaching a fusing point, which will be all the 
more rapidly attained when the old Dutch-speaking elite dies out. 
The radical gaps between Javanese and its traditions and revolu­
tionary Indonesian and its aspirations seems destined to disappear, 
by assimilation and the changing character of the contemporary 
Indonesian experience. The structural Javanization of Indonesian 
and the imposition of Javanese modalities does not alter the fact
(11) For further discussion of the pictures of politics developed 
through a wajang education, see B. R. Anderson, Mythology and 
and the Tolerance of the Javanese, Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project, Monograph Series”, 19 6 5 .
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that the national language remains Indonesian, and that the 
aspirations contained in the Indonesian project are now per­
manent within Indonesian society. The whole process is obscure, 
complex and immensely significant: for it symbolizes and ex­
presses the conquest of modernism via a new language which at 
the same time is becoming anchored in a traditional conception 
of the world, and a deep-rooted vision of the nature of being.
Ben Anderson
February, 1966
